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PUBLIC LANDOWNERSHIP-WHAT  IT IS IN  A SYSTEM  OF LAND  TENURE
I  begin  with  some  definitions  and  descriptions  to  make  clear
what  I am talking  about  when  I refer to  land,  land tenure,  public
landownership,  and land  policy.
Land
By  "land"  I mean  any  desired  but  scarce  attribute  of nature
(including  any  sunk  alteration  thereof effected  by  past  actions  of
man) accessible  to man's control and use.  I mean by "land"  much
more  than  the  layman's  usual  conception  that  it  refers  only  to
units of the earth's  solid surface.
Land Tenure
"Land  tenure"  refers  to  that  institution  (or  system  of institu-
tions)  by  which  control  over  land  is  vested  in  humans  in  order
that its  use  may  be  managed.  In  general,  it  is  synonymous  with
"property  in  land"  or  "landed  property  rights."  Land  tenure  or
property  may be described  as  a "bundle  of rights."  Each  "stick"
in the bundle  is tagged as  one particular  "right of action"  in  man-
agement  and  use  pertaining  to  that  land.  Or  it  is  tagged  as  one
particular attribute  of that land  and one  particular  right  of action
in management  and use  pertaining  to  that attribute.
Because  one  of the  attributes  of land  is  its  location,  the  total
land and the entire  bundle of rights pertaining  to  it are  subdivided
into  defined  locational  units.  For  each  defined  locational  unit  of
land there  is a particular  bundle  of rights.
Each  such bundle of rights may  be (always  is,  in  fact)  broken
open  and  its constituent  sticks of attributes  and  action  rights  dis-
tributed  among  humans  as  individuals  or  collectives,  private,
quasi-public,  or public. This distribution of the bundles of rights-
both the method of their distribution and the resulting pattern of dis-
tribution-defines  and  describes  the  existing  land  tenure  or prop-
erty  system  and  influences  profoundly  the  behavior  of  humans
toward the management  and use of land and the distribution among
them of the fruits of their actions.
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content  and  distribution  of the  bundles  of rights  among  humans
who  have  direct  or  indirect  interest  in  the  management  and  use
of units of land or in  the fruits derived from the units.
Public Landownership
"Public  landownership"  in the layman's  view  envisages  hold-
ing  of the  "title"  stick  to  a  land  unit  by  a  public  together  with
many  or  most  of the  other  attribute-action  sticks  of the  bundle
that  are  implicitly  linked  to  the  title  stick.  But  a  public  may hold
attribute-action  sticks of the bundle of rights to a land unit without
holding  the  title  stick  which  may  be  held  by  private  individuals
or  another  public.  Furthermore,  even  if a  public  holds  the  title
stick  as  well  as other attribute-action  sticks  of a  bundle  of rights
to a land  unit,  private individuals  or other publics may  hold other
of the  attribute-action  sticks  of the  bundle.  Thus,  we  may  have
private  rights  in  public  land,  or  public  rights  in  private  land,  or
rights by one or more other publics in some one public's land.
Public  landownership  therefore,  as  I  use  the  term,  includes
any  holding  of attribute-action  rights  in  a  land  unit  by  a  public
through its government.
PUBLIC  RIGHTS  IN  PRIVATE  LAND.  As  a minimum,  the  public
holds  three  rights  in  any  unit  of  private  land:  (1)  the  right  of
eminent  domain,  (2)  the  right  of police  power,  and  (3)  the  right
to  a  share  in  the  products  derived  from  it.  "Eminent  domain"
is  the right  of a public  to  take over rights  in  private  land  so  long
as  they  are  taken  for a  public  purpose  and fair compensation  for
their  taking  is  paid  their  previous  owner.  "Police  power"  is  the
right  of the  public  to  enjoin  any  use  of private  land  adjudged  to
be  harmful  to  the  public  health,  safety,  morals,  or  welfare  and
to do so without  payment of any compensation  whatsoever  to  the
previous  owners  of the  enjoined  use  rights.  The  police  power,
as implied by the term "enjoined,"  is largely negative  in character,
preventing  what  the  public  views  to  be  undesirable  acts  by  the
land's  other (private)  owners.
The  right  held  by  the  public  to  share  in  the  product  of  the
private  use of private land is, of course,  the right of taxation which,
as real estate taxes or as severance  taxes, constitutes  a direct shar-
ing  in  the  value  product  of the  land's  use.  It  is  a  sort  of "public
rent"  paid by the land's private  owner for his  privilege  to manage
and  use  it granted  to  him by  the public.
There  is,  of course,  nothing  in the  property  system  to prevent
a  public  if  it  so  desires  from  using  its  general  spending  power
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rights  to  a  land  unit.  This  differs  from  eminent  domain  in  that
taking  of  the  rights  cannot  be  forced  by  the  public  under  its
sovereign  powers  and  the  compensation  paid  is  not  subject  to
adjudication  in  the  courts  concerning  its fairness  (reasonableness
or equity)  but is  presumed  to  result from free  bargaining  between
a willing  buyer and a willing seller.
Although  the  above  three  (or  four)  rights  in  private  land  are
always  held by the public, the public  may of course  hold any addi-
tional number of the other attribute-action  sticks  of the bundle  of
rights  attaching  to  a  unit  of land  the  title  to  which  is  nominally
private.  In  fact,  the  three  (or four)  minimum  public  action  rights
I  have  listed above  need not  be  exercised  by  the  public.  If they
are  not,  the bundle  of attribute-action  sticks  held  by  the  private
owner  may  be  wholly  in  the  hands  of the  private  owner.  But
through  the  public's exercise  of its  implicit  rights,  it  may  in  fact
possess any number of specific attribute-action  sticks in the bundle
although  the  ownership  of the  land  unit  in  the  sense  of its  title
may  remain  private.
PRIVATE  RIGHTS IN  PUBLIC  LAND.  Although there are  at least
the  three  (or four)  public  rights  in  private  land  described  above,
there  is  no  minimum  number  or  kind  of private  rights  in  public
land.  I cannot,  for example,  hike on  a military reservation  on  my
own  volition  simply  to  enjoy  the  scenery-or  anything  else.  The
public may,  as  in this case,  hold  all the sticks in the rights bundle.
Mere  citizenship  does  not  endow  the  private  individual  with  any
implicit  right to use  any attribute  of a unit  of public land.
The  public  may,  however,  allot  to  private  persons  explicit
attribute-action  sticks  of the  bundle  of rights-allotting  them  to
particular  persons,  to  persons  in  particular  situations,  or  to  all
persons  in  general.  Thus,  private  rights  in  public  lands  may
emerge.  For example,  under  the mining  law  of  1872,  the  federal
public  granted  the  right  to  any  individual  whatever  of entering
upon  any  of  a  vast  acreage  of  public  lands  to  prospect  for,  to
develop,  and  to exploit  metalliferous  ores.  The  grant  of a private
right  may  be  even  more  complex  than  this  implies.  The  federal
government  in  granting title  to  some of its public  landholdings  to
private  individuals  frequently  reserved  the  subsurface  attributes
of the  land  to  itself.  The  private  right  of prospect  in  such  cases
entails  a  private  right to  enter upon another  private  owner's  land
surface  holding to  reach the  public's  subsurface  holding.
At the  end of this discussion of public landownership,  perhaps
I should  repeat  that  public  landownership,  as  I  use  the  concept,
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any  land  unit  whether  or  not  the  public  also  holds  the  title-or
in  the  layman's  sense,  "owns"  the  surface  attribute  of the  unit.
The land tenure  system,  then, may be a complex and complicated
hodge-podge of shared holdings of sticks from the bundles of rights
pertaining  to  all  lands  by  diverse  private  individuals,  by  private
collectives,  and  by  publics through their governments.
Land Policy
"Land  policy"  consists  of two parts:  (1)  an expression  by  the
public  (usually  by  its  government,  of course)  regarding  the  goals
of public  well-being  to  be  served  by  management  and  use of the
attributes of nature by  its members-individually  and collectively,
privately  and publicly,  and  (2)  a provided  system of landed  institu-
tions  (which  are  collective  action  to  control  or  direct  individual
action)  designed  to  effectuate  those  goals.  As  I will  show  below,
the  second  part  is  far  more  important  in  policy  than  is  the  first
part;  in  fact,  it  would  not  be  wrong  to  say  that  the  second  part
alone is sufficient  to describe  and define the land policy of a public.
The  goals  of a  land  policy  are  in  fact  only  what  the  system
of landed  (together  with  other related)  institutions  says  they  may
be.  Furthermore,  the  land use  and welfare  goals  actually  reached
by society  (regardless  of what  society  says  they are) will be  those
whose  realization  is  facilitated  by  the  functional  behavior  of the
system of landed  (and related)  institutions,  which in  turn  is a con-
sequence  of the  behavior of the  human  instruments  who  operate
them. Thus, I could say simply that a public land policy is expressed
in  the structure  and functional  behavior of the provided system  of
landed  institutions.
Such  a  system  of landed  institutions  consists  in  turn  of two
broadly  different  elements.  The  first  element  is  a  system  of land
tenure  or landed  property  institutions  that defines  how the bundle
of rights  attaching  to  society's  matrix  of nature  shall  be  divided
up,  among  whom,  for what  purposes,  with  what behavioral  free-
doms  but  subject  to  what  restraints,  and  how  and  with  what
restraints  they  may  be  transferred  among  managers  and  users  as
well  as how the very  system of landed  institutions  itself may  over
time  be  modified  and  revised.  The  second element  is  a  structure
of public  (government)  organizations  set  up  and  "programmed"
to operate or police the functional behavior (the operation) of these
landed  property  institutions.
Thus,  public  ownership of title  to  land  and  of other  attribute-
action  sticks in  the  bundle of rights to land  requires governmental
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devices,  (2)  to  manage  them  when  applied,  and  (3) to  alter  their
application  and  management  as conditions  change.
Furthermore,  any land policy  that goes  beyond mere  negation
of public  involvement  and  that  calls  for any  degree  of collective
action  to  direct  and  control  land  management  and  use  rests  on
a  foundation  of public  landownership,  ownership  of title  to  the
fee of some lands, or ownership of separable attribute-action sticks
from the  bundles of rights  attaching  to  other  lands,  together  with
a structure  of government organizations  to plan and manage them.
Public ownership  is implicit in purposive,  collective  action  to raise
the  level  of aggregate  welfare  derived  from the  use  and  develop-
ment of nature.  Public ownership  is  not an incidental  special  case
of ownership  in modern  land  policy but  permeates  it-is, in  fact,
the  core  element  in  land  policy.
WHERE  PUBLIC  LANDOWNERSHIP  FITS IN  A SYSTEM  OF
LAND  TENURE
Having explored  what  public landownership  is  and its relation
to  land  policy  in  general,  I will  devote  the  rest of my  discussion
to considering those particular aspects of a land policy where  pub-
lic ownership  is required  if the land is to perform its greatest  public
service.  I find five conditions  of land use where  public landowner-
ship is  indicated.
First,  if the  public  desires  nonmarketable  services  from land,
public  ownership  (of the  title  or of other  attribute-action  sticks
in  the  bundle  of rights)  will  be required.  Nonmarketable  services
are  those  that  cannot  move  in  the  conventional  market  through
bargaining  at a  price  because  either:  (1) if the service  is  produced
at  all,  no  one  with access  to  it  can  be  excluded  from  consuming
it-frequently  called  "public  goods,"  or (2)  if the  service,  though
of greater  social  welfare  benefit  than  its  cost,  is  produced  and
marketed  privately,  private  gains  do  not  cover  private  costs-
frequently  called  "merit goods."
Examples  of public goods  are  flood control,  air pollution  con-
trol,  provision  or  protection  of  scenic  attributes.  All  share  the
common  character  of nonexcludability  of any  person  so  situated
as  to  enjoy  the  service.  Examples  of  merit  goods  are  public
schools,  public  parks,  fish  and  wildlife  habitat  and  stocks,  high-
ways,  disease  and  insect  eradication  from  lands,  etc.  Such  ser-
vices of land,  both public goods and merit goods, can be produced
only  by  the  public  if produced  at  all.  To  produce  such  services
the  public  must  hold  the  attribute-action  sticks  in  the  bundle  of
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All activities  in  both  examples  require public  ownership  in  some
guise.
Second  among  the  conditions  where  public  landownership  is
indicated are those where  benefits or damages experienced  in space
or over time  by landholders of tracts external to those whose man-
agement or use generates  the benefits or damages are of significant
magnitude-significant  enough  to  warrant  direct  governmental
action relative  to them. Examples of this category of public interest
in land  are natural resource  depletion  or quality degradation  over
time,  downwind  odors and chemical  irritants,  dumping into  lakes
and  rivers  of  poisons  or  materials  detrimental  to  humans  or  to
fish  and wildlife,  or building of unsightly  view-blocking structures.
Solutions to problems of this type are usually referred to as "inter-
nalizing  the  externalities,"  meaning  to  cause  what  are  external
effects  to  impinge  on  their  producer  by  making  them  internal  to
his  decision  system.  One  way  of solving  problems  of this  kind
is through public ownership of land or of attribute-action  interests
in  land.  For  example,  the  public  might  acquire,  through  police
power,  eminent  domain,  or market  purchase,  exclusive  rights  to
use  air  or  water or  land  surface  for  disposal  of wastes.  It  would
thus  be  in  a  position  through  charges,  restraints,  or  granting  of
privileges to impose  upon waste producers  the social costs of their
production.
Third among  the circumstances  favoring public landownership
are  those  where  a  particular  mix of outputs  (goods  and  services)
from  a  land  area  maximizes  production  efficiency  from  that  land
but  the  range  of products  in  the  mix  is  such  that  it  rarely  if ever
characterizes  the output mix of any single firm.  If these goods and
services  are  pretty  well  distributed  over  the  area  and  generally
intermingled,  then it  is highly unlikely that any single  firm or group
of firms  could  produce  all  these  goods  and  services  if the  area
were owned by  it or them, and the area's output  mix  likely would
not  be  optimal.  An  obvious  solution  is  public  ownership  of the
land area with leased or permitted use rights extended  to multiple
firms whose uses may intermingle  on the same area under direction
of the  public  owner  functioning  as  landlord.  An  example  is  the
intermingled use of some national forest areas by cattlemen,  sheep-
men,  timber  harvesters,  mineral  exploiters,  and  recreators.  It
would be  a rare  single private firm that would incorporate  all these
products  in  its  output  mix.  In  such  cases,  public  landownership
and landlordism may be the most effective means to get reasonably
adequate  marginal  social  value  comparisons  among  the  outputs,
the basis for joint product  output efficiency.
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where  privately owned  assets  are  fixed (sunk)  in  the  land  and are
a deterrent  to change  in land  use because  a change requires  aban-
donment  of the  existing sunk investments  and the  sinking of other
investments  in  their  place.  Now,  if  the  public  gain  from  such
change  is greater than the  private loss from  abandonment of exist-
ing sunk investments,  it will be to the public  net benefit to engineer
the  change  (with  or  without  compensation  to  the  private  invest-
ment losers though  generally  such compensation  will be required).
Probably  the  most feasible  way to engineer such  land use changes
would  be  through:  (1)  public  purchase  of the  land  together  with
the sunk investment  with public  reorganization and redevelopment
or  (2)  purchase  by  the  public  of only  the  sunk  investment  values
with  an  agreement  that  the  private  seller  will  be  responsible  for
reinvestment  for  changed  use of the  land.
The  fifth  and  last  circumstance  that  occurs  to  me  in  which
public  landownership  is  warranted  is  for  public  capture  of the
unearned  increments  in  (capital)  value  of land  or  for  the  public
capture  of rent  generated  by  private  exploitation  of scarce  land
attributes.  The  annual  property  tax,  severance  taxes,  and  capital
gains  tax  are  all  moves  in  this direction;  but  they are  only partial
moves  because  each  of them  is  gauged  only  to  raise  the  funds
required to pay the costs  of government  rather than being gauged
to  divert  unearned  increments  in  values  and  unearned  incomes
from  the  individual  private  benefit  to  the  general  public  benefit.
The  argument  for  the  public  capture  of unearned  increments
and  income  (rents)  has  a  long  history.  John  Stuart  Mill  carried
the  Ricardian  logic  in  classical  economics  to  its  implicit  logical
conclusion  when  he  argued  for  the  public  ownership  of all  land.
Building on the same  argument,  Marx developed  the  socialist doc-
trine of public  ownership of capital and  land,  and Henry  George,
the  theory  of public capture  through  the  "single  tax"  of all  rent
from land.
Two other arguments  arising  in different  contexts  and phrased
in different  concepts  also  are  used  in  support of public  ownership
of land.
1.  Land  rents  as  well  as  their  capitalized  value  counterpart
intrinsically and inherently  derive always  and only from monopoly
or monopolistic  power vested  in their owner(s)  by property  rights,
which  is to  say  that rent is  always  a  monopoly  return  or income.
Land  as  nature  is  fixed  in  location  and,  at  any  point  in  time,  in
supply at  each location.  Its  known attributes  are  fixed in  quantity
and spatial distribution. This, of course,  is what economic analysts
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problem here turns not on the fact of monopoly,  which  is inherent
in  nature  and unavoidable,  but on why  private  individuals  should
be  given  grants  of  exclusive  access,  through  private  property
rights,  to these  inherently  monopolistic  points  to  garner  for  their
individual  purposes the inherently monopolistic  returns (which are
rents) from  their use.
2.  Nature,  the  natural environment,  natural resources,  or land
(whatever  one  calls  it)  is  the  "home,"  the  "matrix,"  the
"necessary  fundament"  for  human  existence.  As  such,  land  is
the  proper  concern  of the  dependent  social group  concerned  not
only  with  the  group's survival  but  with  improving or  maximizing
its  welfare  over  time.  It  may  be  argued  that  as  such,  the  land
must and, in fact. does belong to the dependent  society, that collec-
tive  ownership  of the  land  is  a  survival  and  welfare  imperative.
In a fundamental  sense,  land is  already owned collectively  in  that
private,  individualistic  property  rights  in  land  are  a  bestowal  of
such rights  on individuals  by  society  and  such bestowal  is  inher-
ently  and  always  subject  to change  at the volition of society.
In my earlier discussion of the bundle of rights analogy of prop-
erty,  I pointed out  that the  public implicitly  and always  holds  the
attribute-action  sticks  of eminent  domain,  police  power,  sharing
in  the  rents  from  land,  and  the  use  of  its  spending  power,  all
of them  being  powers  to  change  the  distribution  of the  sticks  in
the  bundle  as  between  individuals  and  between  individuals  and
the  public.  Argument  for  public  ownership  of land  does not  then
argue  so  much  for  a  drastic  change  in  what  is  as  it  argues  for
alteration  in  the  distribution  as  between  individuals  and  between
individuals and the public of the attribute-action  sticks of the rights
bundle  in  ways  to  enhance  the  probabilities  of society's  long-run
survival and to  enhance  the  aggregate  level of social welfare  over
time.
LAND  MANAGEMENT  UNDER  PUBLIC  OWNERSHIP
Management,  development,  and  use of land  by  the  public are
not  a necessary,  may  not even  be  a likely,  consequence  of public
landownership.  Privately  owned  land  is  not necessarily  managed,
developed,  and used by  its owner,  the  tenure  institutions of land-
lordism  and tenancy  in numerous forms being well developed  over
a  long  history.  Similarly,  management,  development,  and  use  of
publicly  owned  land  and land  rights may  be transferred  to  subor-
dinate  publics  or  to  private  collectives  and  individuals  under
similar  institutions  of public  landlordism  and  public  or  private
tenancy or permit  arrangements.  It is  probable  that private  opera-
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of management  and  firm  efficiency  though  this  is  a  matter  to  be
determined  on its merits in each particular case or class of circum-
stances.
Neither does public landownership imply  necessary holding by
the  public  of the title  or fee  to  the  land.  For reasons  amply  dis-
cussed earlier, the public may own only particular attribute-action
sticks in the bundle of property rights attaching to many land sites,
leaving  to  private  individuals  the  holding  of the title  or  fee.  For
example,  title to  or ownership  of land  clearly usable  primarily  for
agricultural  purposes  might  be  left  to  private  farm  owners  or
operators with the  public owning a few or many of the other sticks
in  the  property  bundle.  Examples  would  be  public  ownership  of
the  common  property  resources  of water  used  for  irrigation  or
air and  water  used for  waste  disposal,  or the  right to  protect  the
land  against  deterioration  and  depletion,  or  the  right  to  transfer
the  land  to  nonagricultural  development  and  uses,  or  to  manage
and develop  nonagricultural  uses jointly  with agricultural  uses  on
the  land  (such  as  fish  and  wildlife  production  and  their  harvest,
providing  other  forms  of  public  recreation  or  other  amenities  of
social  living,  or preserving the  scenic  attributes).
Neither does  public  landownership  imply  permanent  (in  time)
or  even  long-run  holding  either  of title  to  the  fee  or  of nontitle
attribute-action  sticks  in the bundle  of rights on all land sites.  Pub-
lic landownership  may,  depending on the circumstances,  be short
run  only  where  public  ownership  is  used  as  a  device  to  effect
transition  in  land development  and  use.
CONCLUSION
Thus,  I  come  to the end  of my discussion.  What  do  I  feel  are
the  key points or issues  in my  discussion  of public  landownership
in a land policy?
1.  Public landownership  is but one element  in a system of land
tenure and a system of land tenure is the core of, or the controlling
element  in  a public land  policy.
2.  As  compared to  land policies  of previous  eras,  public  land-
ownership  should  today  be  given  a  greatly  expanded  role  and
should  be granted  greatly  expanded  attention  in public  policy  dis-
cussion  and public  policy education.
3.  Public  landownership  and  private  landownership  are  not
clear-cut,  separate categories.  Public landownership  encompasses
public  holding  of  selected  attribute-action  sticks  in  the  bundle
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belonging  to  private  landowners,  together  with  the  converse
wherein  private  parties hold selected  attribute-action  sticks  in the
property bundle,  with title and other sticks belonging to the public.
4.  Public  landownership  is  indicated  in  circumstances  where
public  goods  and  merit  goods  are  significant  in  the  product  mix
of land  use  and  where  externalities  stemming  from  private  land
uses  are of significant  magnitude.
5.  Public  landownership  together  with  public  captu:re  of land
rents (unearned  increments  and income)  generates,  in  addition  to
enhanced  social efficiency  in production from land,  also enhanced
distributional equity  in the sense not only of abstract philosophical
fairness  but  also of what  I have called  "distributional  efficiency"
for enhanced  social welfare.
6.  Public  landownership  should  be  considered  in  land  policy
as  a  means:  (a) to  capture  for general  public benefit  the unearned
incomes  and  capital  gains  (rent)  otherwise  accruing  to  particular
private  individuals  from  their  private  exploitation  of land,  (b)  to
eliminate  property rights  as  a means  whereby  private parties  may
appropriate  the gains  from the natural  monopoly  powers  inherent
in  land,  and  (c)  to  invest  the  public  with  the  property  powers  to
protect nature, the environment,  the land, which is the very funda-
ment for its long-run  survival and short-run welfare enhancement.
7.  Though public landownership  is a highly controversial  issue,
the  rapidly  growing  importance  of public  values  ia  land  manage-
ment, development, and use makes public discussion of public land-
ownership  imperative.  Only  by  increasing  public  awareness  and
understanding  will  it  be  possible  to  reduce  the  degree  to  which
public  reaction  to  public  landownership  derives  from  emotional
rather  than from  cognitive  responses  to the  concept.  I urge  upon
you  public  policy educators-don't  shun this task longer!
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